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RETHINKING THE INCREASED FOCUS ON
PENAL MEASURES IN IMMIGRATION LAW
AS REFLECTED IN THE EXPANSION OF
THE "AGGRAVATED FELONY" CONCEPT
DIANA R. PODGORNY*
This Comment discusses how the Immigration Acts of 1996 have
focused on poor predictors of character and how they have created
inconsistency in immigration law, increased litigation, and heightened
incentives for illegality and dishonesty. First, the Comment discusses the
currentstate of the criminalprovisions present in immigration law. Then,
it analyzes the primary anti-immigration arguments that motivated these
laws. The Comment goes on to argue that the mainstreamperception that
there is a link between increased immigration and increased crime is
unsupported by statistical data, and that in fact, the Immigration Acts of
1996 have resulted in increased illegality and criminality in the
immigration context. Finally, it will advocate that refocusing on
rehabilitationin immigrationlaw will better achieve the goals ofpreventing
illegality and criminalbehavior in immigration,and that rehabilitationis a
better predictor of character. The goal of this Comment is to identify
methods for reforming immigration law by first recognizing the inequity
and inefficiencies of the currentsystem.
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scenario, based on an actual case.' Mary is a
legal permanent resident who has lived in the United States since she was
one year old. 2 When she was in her mid-twenties, Mary pulled a woman's
hair in a quarrel over a man.3 Upon the advice of her public defender, Mary
pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and was given a one-year sentence,

J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2009.
1 Anthony Lewis, This Has Got Me in Some Kind of Whirlwind, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2000, at A 13.
2 Id.

3 Id.
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suspended for a year's probation.4 More than ten years later, Mary applied
to be naturalized as a U.S. citizen, and she revealed her misdemeanor
conviction in her application for naturalization.5 Instead of being sworn in
as a U.S. citizen, Mary was presented with a deportation hearing notice,
based on her conviction more than ten years earlier.6 What Mary did not
know was that the Immigration Acts of 1996 (the 1996 Acts) defined her
trivial misdemeanor, with its one-year suspended sentence, as an
"aggravated felony" requiring deportation, and the law applied retroactively
to her conviction.7 The public defender who advised Mary to plead guilty,
and the judge who gave her a one-year suspended sentence, could not have
foreseen the drastic repercussions this conviction would have on Mary's life
ten years later. 8 Mary's case seems like an unbelievable aberration from
Congress's intent to remove criminal immigrants from the United States,
but unfortunately Mary's case is a common application 9of the 1996 Acts
and their overly expansive "aggravated felony" definition.
The 1996 Acts were Congress's response to a growing antiimmigration political movement.10 Comprised of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)11 and the Illegal
12
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
the 1996 Acts were aimed at precluding criminal immigrants from seeking
of these laws
legal permanent residence and U.S. citizenship. 13 The passage
14
law.
immigration
and
reform
penal
between
line
the
blurred

4

id.

5

id.
Id.

6

7 Id.
8 id.

9 Since 1997, the more than 156,000 "aggravated felons" who have been removed from
the United States had been in the country an average of fifteen years prior to being placed in
removal proceedings, and 25% had been in the United States for over twenty years.
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, TRAC IMMIGRATION REPORT: How
OFTEN IS THE AGGRAVATED FELONY STATUTE USED (2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/

reports/158/. Many of these individually were lawfully residing in the United States. ld.
10Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007) (discussing the trend

towards criminalization of immigration law).
" Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
21, 28,42 U.S.C. (2006)).
12 Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, U.S.C. (2006)).
"3AEDPA of 1996 §§ 435, 438, 440-42, 110 Stat. at 1273-81 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1105a, 1182, 1326, 1251-52); IIRIRA of 1996 § 321, 110 Stat. at 3009-627
to -628 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)).
14 Legomsky, supra note 10, at 500.
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The definition of aggravated felony for the purpose of removing
individuals from the United States has been expanded so that now an
aggravated felony need no longer be either aggravated or a felony.' 5 Today,
many individuals facing deportation are legal permanent 'residents whose
deportations involve conduct that took place before the 1996 Acts, when the
person did not have notice that his or her conduct would at some point in
the future result in removal from his or her home, job, and family to a
country to which he or she may no longer have any ties.
This Comment explains how these developments have placed a focus
on poor predictors of the character of potential U.S. citizens, and how they
have resulted in inconsistency, increased litigation, and heightened
incentives for illegality and dishonesty. Part II discusses the current state of
the criminal provisions present in immigration law as a result of the 1996
Acts. Part III discusses the primary anti-immigration arguments that these
laws were trying to address. Part IV argues that the mainstream perception
that immigrants are responsible for many of the crimes committed in the
United States is unsupported by statistical data, and that in fact, the
inconsistent application of the 1996 Acts has resulted in the escalation of
the illegality and criminality that these laws were designed to ameliorate.
Part V will advocate that reestablishing a rehabilitation focus in
immigration law will better address the goals of preventing illegality and
criminal behavior in immigration, and that rehabilitation is a better
predictor of future productive U.S. citizenship than today's focus on
criminality.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF CRIMINAL PROVISIONS IN IMMIGRATION LAW
Immigration law has always contained some elements of penal law in
its attempt to preempt criminal aliens from seeking naturalization in the
United States, 16 but the lines between immigration and penal law have
recently become increasingly blurred. Over the past twenty years, there has
been a trend toward criminalizing immigration law, as the United States has
imported criminal justice norms into a domain that is subject to civil
regulation. 17 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (1988 Act) 18 introduced the
concept of aggravated felony into immigration law, with a very narrow
I5

Lupe S. Salinas, Deportations, Removals and the 1996 Immigration Acts: A Modern

Look at the Ex Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 245, 257 (2004) (discussing potential

constitutional questions raised by the expanded definition of "aggravated felony").
16 See Judith Bernstein-Baker, Citizenship in a Restrictionist Era: The Mixed Messages
of FederalPolicies, 16 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 367 (2007).

17 See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 10, at 469.
18 Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
15, 16, 18, 21-23, 26-29, 31, 41-42, 48 U.S.C. 2006)).

DIANA R. PODGORNY

[Vol. 99

application consistent with its harsh penalties. 19 Since then, however,
subsequent immigration acts have progressively expanded the application
of aggravated felony in the immigration context and also increased the
harshness of the penalties for being categorized under this expanded
definition. 20 In particular, AEDPA and IIRIRA significantly altered both
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 199021 and the 1988 Act.
A. THE HISTORICAL INTERSECTION OF PENAL LAW AND
IMMIGRATION LAW

Criminal law and immigration law have been intertwined to some
extent for the past two decades.22

The requirement of "good moral

character" for naturalization was already in place before the 1996 Acts to
screen out potentially undesirable citizens. However, this screening process
has become more drastic over the past twenty years and has increasingly
become a tool for discrimination.
Section 101(f) of the INA describes the "good moral character"
requirement by contrasting it to conduct that demonstrates a lack of good
moral character and bars naturalization.23 The following are barred:
habitual drunkards, criminals, smugglers, aliens who were previously
removed, people dependent on illegal gambling or who have a conviction of
two or more gambling offenses, people who have given false testimony to
obtain a benefit under the INA, people with a previous confinement for 180
days or more as a result of a conviction, and people convicted of an
aggravated felony.24

Other aliens who are barred from naturalization under § 101(f) are
those who have been convicted of a crime involving "moral turpitude," or
those who admit to having committed a crime involving "moral turpitude"

1"Id. §§ 7343(a)(2), 7347, 7349, 102 Stat. at 4181, 4470-73 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(17), 1252(a)) (including in the definition of aggravated felony under this
Act murder, drug trafficking, and illegal firearms trafficking).
20 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, §§ 433, 435, 438-43, 110 Stat. 1214, 1273-81 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18 U.S.C. (2006)); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 321, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 to -628
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43) (2006)).
21 Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
29 U.S.C. 2006)).
22 See generally Legomsky, supra note 10, at 469 (discussing the asymmetric
incorporation of criminal justice norms into immigration law, which is a system of civil
regulation).
23 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2006), as amended by INA of 1990 § 509(a), 101 Stat. at 5051.
24 Id. § 101(f)(3)-(f)(8).
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or acts that constitute the essential elements of such a crime. 25 However,
deportation can only be ordered for a single crime involving moral turpitude
if it was committed within five years after entry and resulted in the
imposition of a sentence of one year or more.26 Two or more convictions of
crimes involving moral turpitude subject an alien to deportation without
time limit, if they did not arise out of a "single scheme of criminal
misconduct. 27
Courts have never clearly defined the term "moral turpitude."
However, the term is generally understood to connote something more than
mere illegality or criminality, and consequently, it is evaluated based on
moral, rather than legal, standards.2 8 Courts have described moral turpitude
as "an act of baseness, vileness[,] or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
man."2 9 Specific crimes that have been held to involve moral turpitude
include the following: deceptive practices designed to affect the public
market price of stocks or shares at the expense of the investing public,3 °
obtaining student loans by fraud or false statements, 31 tax evasion,32
receiving stolen property,3 3 conspiracy to launder the proceeds of illegal
drug trafficking,3 4 knowingly providing false information to a police officer
to prevent apprehension or obstruct the prosecution of a person, 35 and
aggravated assault against a peace officer.3 6 Although morality has always
been a requirement for naturalization-with morality defined to include
undesirable moral traits as well as some crimes-deportation was generally
reserved for repeat offenders. The 1988 Act was the first in a series of acts
that expanded the nature of the offenses mandating deportation.

25 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2006).
27

Id.
Id.

28

See, e.g., Guarneri v. Kessler, 98 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1938); Wing v. United States, 46

26

F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1931).
29 BouvIER's LAW DICTIONARY: A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW 2246 (Francis
Rawle ed., 3d rev., 8th ed., West Pub. 1914); see, e.g., Matter of Mueller, 11 1. & N. Dec.
268 (B.I.A. 1965).
30 Matter of McNaughton, 16 I. & N. Dec. 569, 569 (B.I.A. 1978).
31 Kabongo v. I.N.S., 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1988).
32 Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 1957) (noting that the intent to defraud the
government is a prerequisite to conviction).
33 De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 2002).
34 Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003).
35 Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 2005).
36 Matter of Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A. 1988).
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B. THE 1988 ACT INTRODUCED THE NOTION OF AGGRAVATED FELONY
AS A BASIS FOR REMOVAL
The policy goal of the 1988 Act was a "drug free America., 37 The Act
sought to curb drug abuse by reducing the number of drug users and
decreasing the availability of illegal drugs. 38 The 1988 Act introduced the
definition of aggravated felony to immigration law, to which it attached
harsh penalties for immigrants. 39 The penalties for an aggravated felony
conviction included detention, expedited deportation proceedings, and an
expanded bar on reentry into the United States.40 An aggravated felony
conviction mandated removal if the defendant received a sentence of at
least five years imprisonment. 4 1 Because of the severity of these penalties
for immigrants, the 1988 Act advanced a very narrow definition of
aggravated felony, which included only murder, weapons trafficking, and
drug trafficking.42
C. DISCRETIONARY RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION UNDER THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1990
Through the INA, the Attorney General gained broad discretion to
deport aliens, and the deportation of certain criminal aliens became
compulsory.43 However, the Attorney General cannot deport an alien when
the deportation "would threaten his life or freedom on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion," except in cases where the alien was convicted of a serious crime
that "constitutes a danger to the community. ' 4 The INA historically
contained § 212(c), which provided that the Attorney General could
exercise discretion in deciding whether to waive deportation of an alien

37 Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, Legislation Fact Sheet, http://www.whitehouse
drugpolicy.gov/about/legislation.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
38 Id.
39 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7343(a)(2), 102 Stat. 4181,
4470 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2006)).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42

Id.

43 See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1990, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1451(h)

(1994), amended by IIRIRA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C., § 307(a), 110 Stat. 3009546, -612.
44 Id. § 1253(h)(1)-(h)(2)(B); Brent K. Newcomb, Comment, Immigration Law and the
Criminal Alien: A Comparison of Policiesfor Arbitrary Deportations of Legal Permanent
Residents Convicted of Aggravated Felonies, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 697, 705 (1998) (discussing
decisions made by each branch of government in the progression of immigration law).
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subject to deportation or removal.45 In order to qualify for § 212(c)
suspension of deportation, the alien had to demonstrate that deportation
would cause "extreme hardship" to the alien or his or her family, that the
alien had accrued at least seven years of continuous presence in the United
States, that his or her individual absences from the United States were
"brief, casual, and innocent," and that he or she had good moral character. 6
These factors made it easier for aliens with strong family ties to the United
States to escape deportation.
The 1996 Acts made the waiver contained in § 212(c) unavailable to
legal permanent residents who had committed an aggravated felony and
served at least five years for the crime.47 Making § 212(c) unavailable to
legal permanent residents undermined the Attorney General's discretionary
power to consider the individual's rehabilitation since the conviction. As a
result, a long-time legal permanent resident who has proven to be an
upstanding member of the community since a long-ago conviction will be
removed from possibly the only country that he or she has ever known.
D. THE PROGRESSION OF THE EXPANSION OF AGGRAVATED FELONY
THROUGH THE 1996 ACTS
The congressional legislation passed prior to the 1996 Acts laid the
groundwork for the extent to which criminal activity may now affect a noncitizen's deportability. 48 The 1996 Acts expanded the definition of
aggravated felony, applied it retroactively to convictions entered prior to
these acts, and restricted the circumstances under which aliens could seek
relief from the Attorney General or other officials. 49 The result is that some
41 INA of 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1182, repealed by IIRIRA of 1996 § 304(b), 110 Stat. at
3009-597.
46 Mark R. von Sternberg, Cancellation of Removal Under the Immigration and

Nationality Act: Emerging Restrictions on the Availability of "Humanitarian" Remedies, in
BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW

305, 307 (Stephen W. Yale-Loehr ed., 2007) (providing a practical

guide to removal proceedings).
41 Id. at 320.
48 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 expanded the list of "aggravated

felonies" while at the same time decreasing procedural safeguards. § 501, 104 Stat. at 5048
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101). Four years later, the Immigration and Nationality
Technical Corrections Act added white collar crimes to the definition of aggravated felony.
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222,
108 Stat. 4305, 4320-22 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)). That same year
Congress expedited the procedures for removing alien offenders from the country, thereby
limiting the procedural safeguards available to aliens facing deportation. Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 130004, -05, -07, 108
Stat. 1796-2156, -2027 to -2029 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105, 1158, 1252,
1252a (2006)).
49 Salinas, supra note 15, at 255-56.
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crimes that qualify for removal are no longer either aggravated, or
felonies.50 Some scholars argue that under federal criminal law the term
aggravatedsimply refers to a criminal activity made worse, or more severe,
by violence, but the 1996 Acts categorize many offenses that do not involve
violence, or any circumstances making them more severe, as aggravated
felonies. 51 Felony is described in the Federal Criminal Code as "any
offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year," a definition in direct conflict with the so-called felonies included in
the 1996 Acts, many of which are in fact merely misdemeanors under the
Federal Criminal Code-for example, theft or burglary offenses. 2 Under
the 1996 Acts, "conviction" is defined as:
[Al formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication has
been withheld, where "(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has
entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant
finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered53 some form of punishment, penalty, or
restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed."

On its face, this definition includes an alien who receives a deferred
adjudication-such as probation or community supervision-even if his or
her record is cleared by the dismissal of the conviction. 54 Under the 1996
55
Acts an aggravated felony conviction bars naturalization for five years.
The 1996 Acts further provide that immigration judges may not
consider mitigating factors because the determinative factor is conviction of
an aggravated felony.56 Furthermore, the Acts stripped deportation of
judicial review until the Supreme Court created a caveat to this policy in
2001, holding that "the provision denying persons with pre-1996
aggravated felony convictions the opportunity to file for a waiver under
former § 212(c) of the INA violated the principles of retroactivity., 57 This
ruling gave a small break to non-citizens convicted prior to the enactment of
AEDPA and IRIRA, provided that their convictions were the product of

50 Id. at 257.

5' Id. at 256.
52 Id. at 257.
53 Id. at 267 (emphasis omitted) (quoting IIRIRA of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(48)(A)).
54 Id.
55 See Immigration Defense Project, N.Y. State Defenders Ass'n, Citizenship Alert for
Lawful Permanent Residents with Criminal Convictions, http://www.nysda.org/idp/
webPages/citizenshipAlert.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
56 Id.
57 Barbara Hines, Immigration Law, 35 TEX. TECH L. REv. 923, 925 (2004) (surveying
immigration cases dealing with habeas corpus jurisdiction (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289 (2001))).
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plea bargaining and that the aliens
5 8 were eligible for § 212(c) relief at the
time the convictions were entered.
E. ILL-ADVISED CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION LAWS UNDER AEDPA
AEDPA, also passed in 1996, contained drastic provisions affecting
non-citizens, including controversial summary exclusion procedures, an
expansion of the grounds of deportability, the restriction of discretionary
relief, and the required detention of almost all criminal offenders.59
AEDPA also changed the terminology from deportation or exclusion to
removal, and it expansively and retroactively made legal permanent
residents removable for past crimes. 60 Additionally, AEDPA weakened the
sentencing requirements for qualification as an aggravated felony and added
more crimes to its definition.6 1 With the passing of AEDPA, the aggravated
felony definition was expanded to include offenses such as commercial
bribery, forgery, counterfeiting, certain gambling offenses, vehicle
trafficking, obstruction of justice, perjury, and bribery of a witness. 62 In
signing AEDPA, President Bill Clinton stated that the bill "makes a number
of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws" and he urged
63
Congress to "correct them in the pending immigration reform legislation.'
However, instead of heeding the President's advice, Congress expanded

" 533 U.S. at 314-15. Consider how § 212(c) of the INA would have affected Mary,
whose case was introduced at the beginning of this Comment. Prior to the Supreme Court's
holding in INS v. St. Cyr in 2001, Mary would have been ineligible for a waiver of
deportation under § 212(c). After St. Cyr, Mary would be able to apply for the waiver of
deportation since her conviction occurred prior to 1996, when the Immigration Acts were
passed. In considering Mary's request for a waiver of deportation under § 212(c), the
Attorney General could exercise discretion in deciding whether to waive her deportation.
Mary would likely qualify for a suspension of deportation since the deportation would cause
"extreme hardship" to her or her family given that she has known no other home besides the
United States, she had accrued at least seven years of continuous presence in the United
States with only brief absences, and she is a person of good moral character as she never
committed any crime of moral turpitude and has lived as a model citizen with the exception
of the quarrel that was the subject of her conviction.
59 Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214, 1276-78 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 11 05a, 1182,
1252, 1252a (2006)).

id.
id.
62 Id.
60

61

63

Won Kidane, Committing a Crime While a Refugee: Rethinking the Issue of

Deportation in Light of the Principle Against Double Jeopardy, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
383, 431 (2007) (arguing that deportation of convicted criminals is a second punishment and
thus violates the Double Jeopardy Clause).
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those "ill-advised" provisions of AEDPA by enacting the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) a few months later.6 4
F. IIRIRA: FROM ILL-ADVISED TO DRACONIAN
IIRIRA, enacted shortly after AEDPA, focused on the apprehension
and removal of undocumented immigrants.65 The statute substantively
limited the removal criteria and the availability of discretionary relief, and
created different expedited procedures for removal.66 Procedurally, IIRIRA
decreased remedies available to criminal immigrants when it further
expanded the scope of aggravated felony in the immigration context. 67
Offenses labeled aggravated felonies under IIRIRA include petty larceny,
assault, second-degree theft, burglary, and transporting an illegal alien into
the United States.68
IIRIRA also further reduced the sentencing
requirement for categorization as an aggravated felony from the initial fiveyear requirement to a one-year requirement, thus dramatically expanding
the set of potential aggravated felonies. 69 The IIRIRA changes apply
retroactively to convictions that were entered at a time when they were not
considered aggravated felonies for the purposes of the application of
immigration laws.70
Through IIRIRA, Congress repealed § 212(c) of the INA and replaced
it with a new section excluding those persons previously convicted of any
aggravated felony from the class of persons entitled to relief from removal
at the discretion of the Attorney General.7 1 IIRIRA also replaced the
discretionary relief of § 212(c) with a more limited "cancellation of
removal" available under § 240(a) of the INA.72
Section 240(a)'s
Id.
Brooke Hardin, Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales: An Examination of Retroactivity and
the Effect of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 27 J. NAT'L
ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 291, 296-97 (2007).
66 Quinn H. Vandenberg, How Can the United States Rectify Its Post-9/ll Stance on
Noncitizens' Rights?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 605, 619 (2004) (arguing
that AEDPA, IIRIRA, and the USA PATRIOT Act lead to a "rights-deprived" environment
for immigrants).
67 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 671, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-720 to -722 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43) (2006)).
64
65

68

id.

69 Id.
70

See Bazuaye v. INS, No. 94-CV-1280, 1997 WL 187355, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15,

1997) (holding that an alien was deportable as an aggravated felon based on a 1992
conviction for an offense that was added to the definition of "aggravated felony" in 1994).
71 Salinas, supra note 15, at 255.
72 IIRIRA of 1996 § 304, 110 Stat. at 3009-589 to -595 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a)-(b) (2006)). Cancellation of removal requires longer periods of physical
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cancellation of removal differs significantly from § 212(c)'s suspension of
deportation and renders obtaining such a waiver almost impossible. The
statutory standard for the waiver changed from the broad requirement of a
showing of extreme hardship to the alien or his or her family to the narrow
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the alien's U.S. citizen or
legal permanent resident family.73 Hardship to the alien no longer matters.
Furthermore, to qualify for cancellation of removal an alien must show ten
years of continuous physical presence in the United States.74 Under
IIRIRA, aliens convicted of an aggravated felony do not qualify for
cancellation of removal.75
With IIRIRA, Congress effectively made conviction of a crime
grounds for removal without any real possibility of relief, by vesting the
power of expedited removal in individual immigration officers whose
review. 76
decisions are subject to neither judicial nor administrative
Furthermore, under IIRIRA the conviction need not be final for the
Finally, the statute broadens the scope of
purposes of removal.7
convictions that render an alien removable by changing the relevant
sentence from that which is actually imposed, to the one that may be
imposed. 78 IIRIRA increases the chances that a non-citizen will be
deported by eliminating the finality of a conviction through the application
of subsequent immigration repercussions resulting from the conviction and
9
by broadening the sentence to be considered under the IIRIRA.

presence in the United States and has more disqualifying provisions, making it much more
difficult to obtain relief. Id.
73 Von Sternberg, supra note 46, at 305-06. There is not a lot of precedent describing
what exactly constitutes exceptional and extremely unusual hardship under the current
statute, making it hard to predict which cases would qualify for cancellation of removal
under this standard. See id. at 307. Several courts have determined that cancellation claims
are not subject to federal court review since the determination of exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the relative entails a "subjective, discretionary" judgment. Id. at 324
n.30; see Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 888 (9th Cir. 2003); Gonzalez-Oropeza
v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1332 (1 th Cir. 2003).
74 Von Sternberg, supra note 46, at 305.
75 id.
76

Vandenberg, supra note 66, at 620.

77 Id. at 620-21.
78 Id. at 620.
79 Id. at 620-21.
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G. USA PATRIOT ACT: VESTING DISCRETIONARY DETAINMENT
POWER IN ENTRY-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS
The USA PATRIOT Act,80 passed in 2001, makes non-citizens
removable for "wholly innocent associational activity, excludable for pure
speech, and detainable at the Attorney General's discretion, without a
hearing and without a finding that they pose a danger or flight risk."'"
Section 236(a) gives the Attorney General the discretion to certify and
detain any non-citizen if the Attorney General has "reasonable grounds to
believe" that the non-citizen has participated in an activity that "endangers
the national security of the United States. 8 2 The USA PATRIOT Act
defines "terrorist activity" very broadly as, among other things, the use or
threat to use a weapon, and "terrorist organization" equally as broadly, as a
83
group of two or more persons that has used or threatened to use a weapon.
The open-ended definitions have had a dramatic effect on non-citizens
because state and local law enforcement agencies, unaware of current
immigration law, can destroy an immigrant's life through the wording of a
particular criminal charge, indictment, or plea.8 4 The expansion of the
grounds for removal provided by the USA PATRIOT Act is the culmination
of a series of drastic such expansions adversely affecting non-citizens.
III. ANTI-IMMIGRATION BIASES OF THE RECENT LAWS
Three justifications emerge from the examination of the rhetoric
behind the recent immigration laws-the perception that non-citizens are
the reason for increasing criminality in the United States, a desire to protect
of the economic interests of citizens, and a blurred line between crime
85
control efforts related to non-citizens and protection of national security.
s0 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, 50 U.S.C.
(2006)).
s Vandenberg, supra note 66, at 621 (quoting David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L.
REv. 953, 966 (2002)).
12 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 412, 115 Stat. at 351 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C.A. § 1226(a)(3)).
3
Id. § 411, 115 Stat. at 346 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)). The USA
PATRIOT Act defines association with a terrorist organization as engagement or intended
engagement "solely, principally, or incidentally in activities that could endanger the welfare,
safety, or security of the United States." Id. (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 11 82(a)(3)(B)(iii)) (emphasis added).
84 Vandenberg, supra note 66, at 623.
85 See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: ImmigrationRestrictions,
Crime Control and NationalSecurity, 39 CoNN. L. REv. 1827 (2007) (arguing that removal

provisions are ill-suited to achieving national security or other immigration policy goals).
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In the late 1980s, the Office of Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) noted that as immigration levels increased in the United States, the
rate of criminal activities attributable to aliens and the percentage of aliens
in the prison population rose, leading the INS to conclude that expedition of
the deportation process is critical in reducing prison overcrowding.86 The
weakness of this argument is that it looks solely at the number of
immigrants in prisons, instead of the percentage due to increased
immigration levels. In passing the INA, Congress responded to the INS's
inefficiency in investigating, detaining, and deporting alien criminal
offenders. 87 Congress was also responding to concerns that aliens were
using frivolous arguments to delay or avoid deportation, 88 prompting the
introduction of expedited deportation proceedings with
the goal of
89
"dismissing all criminal aliens' appeals as a matter of law."
In the years immediately prior to the 1996 Acts, the justification for
various laws affecting non-citizens was to prevent immigrants from taking
advantage of economic benefits at the expense of U.S. citizens, but the
rhetoric drew upon the public perception that immigrants are criminals. 90
IIRIRA also contained a provision for denying public benefits to
unauthorized non-citizens based, in part, on the public perception that
immigrants receive public benefits that they do not pay for with taxes. 9 1
The rhetoric of the debates surrounding the IIRIRA focused on a supposed

86

See U.S.

IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., IMMIGRATION ACT OF

1990 REPORT

ON CRIMINAL ALIENS (1992).
87

See 136 CONG. REc. 27,073 (1990).

88 See 136 CONG. REC. 35,612 (1990).
89

Newcomb, supra note 44, at 702-03 (citing Peter Hill, Did Congress Eliminate All

Judicial Review of Orders of Deportation, Exclusion, and Removal for Criminal Aliens?,
FED. LAW., Mar-Apr. 1997, at 43, 44).
90 In 1994, California passed Proposition 187, which prevented illegal immigrants from
taking advantage of social services, health care, and public education. Chac6n, supra note
85, at 1840. The advocates of the measure were apparently concerned with competition for
public benefits, but the rhetoric for justifying the measure portrayed migrants as criminals.
Id. at 1840-41. Barbara Coe, who was the drafter of the measure, stated:
You get illegal alien children, Third World children, out of our schools, and you will reduce the
violence.
That is a fact ....You're not dealing with a lot of shiny face, little
kiddies ....You're dealing with Third World cultures who come in, they shoot, they beat, they

stab and they spread their drugs around in our school system. And we're paying them to do it.
Id. at 1841. In a 2005 speech, Coe continued to perpetuate her view that immigrants are
criminals when she referred to undocumented immigrants as "illegal barbarians who are
cutting off [the] heads and appendages of blind, white, disabled gringos." Id. (citing Daphne
Eviatar, Nightly Nativism, NATION, Aug. 28, 2006, at 18, 22).
91See Chac6n, supra note 85, at 1842-43.
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link between immigrants and crime in the United
States to gain public
92
support and capitalize on public misconceptions.
However, the primary motivation behind the 1996 Acts and the USA
PATRIOT Act was a concern over national security.93 AEDPA was passed
in response to the Oklahoma City bombings-a terrorist act ironically
perpetrated by a U.S. citizen-and to the 1992 World Trade Center
bombings.94 In discussing AEDPA, Congress used crime and terrorism
interchangeably with respect to immigration removal proceedings.95 Since
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the immigration debate has
focused around the term nationalsecurity, and the removal of non-citizens
96
for criminal offenses is frequently depicted as national security policy.
The term "border security" has become "a ubiquitous descriptive term for
immigration reform ...
Despite the fact that IIRIRA is a crime control
measure, it has been referred to as a border security regulation in the years
since its passing.98 These characterizations highlight how beliefs and
rhetoric on immigration, crime, and national security issues have become
fused into one indistinct concept. 99

92 Representative Orrin Hatch (R-UT) claimed that "a lot of our criminality in this
country today happens to be coming from criminal, illegal aliens who are ripping our
country apart. A lot of the drugs are coming from these people." 142 CONG. REC. 25,362
(1996).
93 During the debate over IIRIRA, Senator Spencer Abraham emphasized that he drew "a
sharp distinction between immigrants who come to this country to make better lives for
themselves and those who come to break our laws and prey upon our citizens." 142 CONG.

REc. 26,684 (1996).
94 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. 7960-68 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (alternating

discussion of the Oklahoma City bombing and criminal aliens).
95Representative Hyde read excerpts from the letter of the widow of a victim of the
Oklahoma City bombing advocating for the antiterrorism bill as a victory over extremists.
Id. Representative Hyde then immediately proceeded to respond to the excerpt he read by
advocating for the bill's provisions for the deportation of criminal aliens, thereby connecting
the terrorist attack in Oklahoma City, perpetrated by an American, with criminal aliens. Id.
96 Chac6n, supra note 85, at 1853.
9' Id. at 1853-54.
98 Id. at 1854.

99Id. To demonstrate the interwoven nature of criminal alien measures and national
security, Chac6n quotes a statement made by CNN anchor Lou Dobbs, in which Dobbs
equates illegal immigration with crime and then adds the threat of terrorism into the picture.
Id.
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IV. THE ANTI-IMMIGRATION SENTIMENT BEHIND THE 1996 ACTS AND THE
ACTS' INCONSISTENT APPLICATION HAVE LED TO AN ESCALATION OF THE
VERY SAME PROBLEMS TARGETED BY THE ACTS

A. ANTI-IMMIGRATION ARGUMENTS REGARDING CRIMINAL
PROPENSITIES OF IMMIGRANTS ARE UNFOUNDED

The view that immigrants are inclined to commit crimes prevails in our
society, despite a lack of empirical support.10 0 A study by sociologists at
the University of California, Irvine, based on census data from the year
2000, found that the incarceration rate of U.S.-born persons was almost four
times higher than that of foreign-born persons.101 This study supports
earlier research revealing that "increased immigration is actually a major
factor associated with lower crime rates" and that incarceration rates are
extremely low among immigrants and increase rapidly by the second
generation. 102 Because the immigrant population as a whole is younger,
more male, and less educated than the average native-born American, other
studies have taken into account specific crime predictors, such as gender,
age, and education. 10 3 Even when taking into account these factors,
immigrants' crime rates are dramatically lower than those of
demographically similar native-born Americans, as well as those of the
native-born population as a whole. 10 4 Sociological data suggest that firstgeneration immigrants are 45% less likely to commit violent crimes than
third-generation Americans, and second-generation immigrants are 22%
less likely.' 0 5 These findings suggest that the problem rests with American
society and not with the immigrant communities, because
crime increases
10 6
dramatically as non-citizens assimilate into society.

100 In a survey of a nationally representative sample of adults conducted in 2000 by the
General Social Survey, almost three quarters of those surveyed believed that there is a causal
link between immigration and increased crime rates, with 25% of those surveyed stating that
it is very likely that more immigrants are the cause of higher crime rates. Id. at 1840.
10' Id. at 1879. The incarceration rate of U.S.-born persons was 3.51%, while that of
foreign-born persons was 0.86%. Id. White U.S.-bom citizens are twice as likely to be
incarcerated as foreign-born citizens. Id.
102 Id. at 1879-80; Matthew T. Lee et al., Does Immigration Increase Homicide?
Negative Evidence from Three Border Cities, 42 Soc. Q. 559, 560, 571 (2001) (finding no
correlation between immigration and higher homicide rates); Robert J. Sampson, Op-Ed.,
Open Doors Don't Invite Criminals,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at Al 5.
103 Legomsky, supra note 10, at 501.
" Id. at 501-02.
105 Daniel Kanstroom, Post-Deportation Human Rights Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron, or
Necessity?, 3 STAN. J. C.R. &C.L 195, 210 (2007).
106 Id.
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Despite the empirical reality, a survey conducted in 2000 found that
nearly 75% of Americans surveyed thought that immigrants are "somewhat
likely" or "very likely" to increase crime rates in the United States. 1 7 One
observer has noted that the misperception that immigration results in higher
crime rates may be attributed to assumptions that conflate immigration
generally with illegal immigration, racial stereotypes, crime, and
terrorism. 1° 8 Political discourse and media coverage highlight illegal
immigration and immigrant involvement in terrorism, supporting the
public's perception that a positive correlation exists between crime and
immigration. 10 9 Because there is little attempt to distinguish between legal
and illegal immigration in public discourse, the general public rarely
differentiates between the two when opining on immigration or crime
control measures.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the escalation in the removal of
aliens has had a positive impact on reducing crime, since violent crime is
still increasing.110 Indeed, in many cases, long-time lawful permanent
residents have been deported because of criminal convictions that the
general population would regard as trivial violations. 1 ' These deportations
remove individuals who pose no actual threat to society and, therefore,
effect no real reduction of the number of dangerous criminals in the
12
country.1
B. THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE 1996 ACTS HAS
RESULTED IN THE ESCALATION OF IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS
1. The Definition ofAggravated Felony in the 1996 Acts Has Resulted in
Inconsistent Applications
Courts and administrative agencies have applied the concept of
aggravated felony inconsistently. 13 As a result, immigrants face removal
Id.
108Legomsky, supra note 10, at 502-03.
107

109 Id.
110

See Chac6n, supra note 85, at 1878.

111See Hem v. Maurer, 458 F.3d 1185, 1186 (10th Cir. 2006) (evaluating a removal
order against a paraplegic Cambodian native convicted of assaulting a police officer); United
States v. Christopher, 239 F.3d 1191 (11 th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Graham, 169
F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant's conviction of misdemeanor for petty
larceny was sufficient to meet the statutory requirement for aggravated felony because the
defendant had received the maximum sentence of one year's imprisonment).
112 See Chac6n, supra note 85, at 1884.
113 See, e.g., Daniel J. Murphy, Guilty Pleas and the Hidden Minefield of Immigration
Consequencesfor Alien Defendants: Achieving a "JustResult" by Adjusting Maine's Rule
11 Procedure, 54 ME. L. REV. 157, 158-59 (2002).
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after receiving either suspended sentences or the maximum sentence for a
particular offense.' 14 In contrast, immigrants who received a less-thanmaximum sentence for the same offense successfully escape classification
as aggravated felons and the immigration consequences of such
classification. 1 5 The laws also apply to immigrant defendants who
accepted a plea bargain in a criminal prosecution prior to the charged
offense being defined as an aggravated felony.' 16 Finally, there are
jurisdictional inconsistencies in the statutory definitions of criminal
offenses leading to classification of the offense as an aggravated felony in
certain jurisdictions, but not in others.
2. Suspended and Maximum Sentences, and Vacated Convictions
Many criminal defense attorneys and judges believe that deferred
judgments 1 7 do not result in immigration consequences when in fact "the
controlling factor in finding a conviction for purposes of immigration law is
an admission of the essential elements of the offense charged followed 11by8
some form of restraint on the defendant's liberty," including probation.
In United States v. Christopher, the defendant faced removal after his
conviction for shoplifting, which is a misdemeanor, resulted in a suspended
sentence of twelve months' imprisonment.' 19 The removal occurred
because, for immigration purposes, all that is required for classification 12
as0
an aggravated felony is a conviction with a sentence of at least one year.
In United States v. Graham, the defendant's conviction for petty larceny
satisfied the statutory requirement for aggravated felony because the
12
defendant received the maximum sentence of one years' imprisonment. '
These examples demonstrate the importance of sentencing distinctions in
determining immigration consequences under the 1996 Acts.
In
114

Id.

115 Id.
116

See Salinas, supra note 15, at 256-59 (discussing the retroactive application of

IJRIRA and the change in the definition of aggravated felony to include conviction for which
the alien receives a sentence of at least one year, as opposed to the five-year sentence
requirement of pre-IIRIRA laws).
117 With a deferred judgment, although a plea may be taken, the adjudication of guilt is
not entered at that time. The adjudication of guilt is deferred either until the completion of
probation or until there is a violation of probation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 859 (8th ed.
2004).
118 Jeff Joseph, Immigration Consequences of Criminal Pleas and Convictions, COLO.
LAW., Oct. 2006, at 55, 56 (providing an overview of immigration issues that criminal
attorneys should consider).
' 239 F.3d 1191, 1191-92 (llth Cir. 2001).
120 See id. at 1193.
121 169 F.3d 787, 787-88 (3d Cir. 1999).
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Christopher, the defendant's sentence was suspended, yet this made no
difference for immigration purposes. In Graham, if the defendant had
received a sentence that was even one day shorter, he might have escaped
removal. The immigration consequences can be drastically different
depending on whether the defendant receives a maximum sentence or
something less, and a suspended sentence does not spare the defendant from
removal.
Even a vacated conviction carries immigration consequences. The
Fifth Circuit examined the effect of a vacated federal conviction on
immigration proceedings as a matter of first impression in RenteriaGonzales v. INS.'22 The Fifth Circuit determined that if Congress intended
to exclude vacated convictions from the definition it could have done so
explicitly.1 3 The court reasoned that the issue of vacated convictions
124
occurred so frequently that Congress must have anticipated this scenario.
Congress's silence on the issue, according to the
court, "strongly implies
125
exception."'
an
such
intend
not
did
that Congress
3. Plea Bargainingand Its Unforeseen FutureRepercussions on
Immigration Status
Non-citizen defendants are often not informed about the possible
immigration repercussions of pleading "guilty" or "no contest" to a criminal
charge.' 2 6 Most jurisdictions do not require the court or the defense counsel
to inform non-citizen criminal defendants that their conviction may lead to
deportation. 127 Plea agreements that may seem appealing because they
require no imprisonment can lead to deportation and extended exclusion
from the United States. 28 For example, an alien's plea of no contest to a
drug charge in a Wyoming state court constituted a conviction for the
purpose of removal under the aggravated felony classification, even though
the imposition of the sentence was deferred and the alien was placed on
122322 F.3d 804, 812-13 (5th Cir. 2002).
123 Id.at
124
125

813.

Id.
Id.; see also Ekwutozia U. Nwabuzor, The Cry of the Collosus: Discipio v. Ashcroft,

Nonacquiescence, and Judicial Deference in Immigration Law, 50 How. L.J. 575, 579
(2007) (discussing a circuit split on the issue of whether a conviction vacated for substantive
errors should be used for the purpose of deportation).
126 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 113, at 158.
127 John J. Francis, Failure to Advise Non-Citizens of Immigration Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Should This Be Grounds to Withdraw a Guilty Plea?, 36 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 691, 693 (2003).
128 Id. (arguing that non-citizen criminal defendants should be afforded greater latitude in
withdrawing guilty pleas when they are made without awareness of potential immigration
consequences).
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probation without entry of a judgment of guilt. 129 In another instance, an

alien's guilty-plea conviction for theft rendered him ineligible for
discretionary relief from removal where the conviction amounted to an
aggravated
felony under the statute enacted after the date of the alien's
0

plea.

13

Although the defendant's lack of knowledge as to the potential
ramifications of pleading guilty raises the question of whether the pleas
taken in these circumstances are voluntarily entered, the failure to advise a
client about potential deportation does not constitute grounds for
withdrawing the guilty plea. 31 This is because deportation is viewed as a
collateral, rather than a direct, consequence of the criminal conviction, and
collateral consequences are not a valid basis for withdrawing a guilty
plea. 132 Courts have held that what makes the immigration effects of a plea
''collateral" is the fact that deportation is "not the sentence of the court
which accept[s] the plea but of another agency over which the trial judge
has no control and for which he [or she] has no responsibility."'3 Courts
have further held that despite the fact that immigration consequences arise
"virtually by operation of law," they are not direct consequences of a
criminal conviction.' 34
Furthermore, courts have argued that the
defendant's due process is not violated in this situation because due process
does not require
that the court inform the defendant about immigration
35
consequences.1

4. Statutory Definitions of Criminal Offenses, Differences in the Records of
Conviction, andExercise of JudicialDiscretion Create Inconsistency in the
Application of Immigration Consequences
The inconsistency in the application of the immigration laws reflects
the injustice of the legislation and its ineffectiveness in reducing crime.
129 Gradiz

v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2007).
Alvaranga v. INS, 232 F. App'x 56 (2d Cir. 2007).
131Francis, supra note 127, at 694.
132 Id. Deportation has been viewed as a civil penalty.
130

See, e.g.,
Harisiades v.

Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952). Collateral consequences are not a valid basis for
withdrawing a guilty plea. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th
Cir. 1971) (holding that failure to advise a client that a plea will result in loss of good time
credit does not render it invalid); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1970)
(omitting discussion on the record about possibly imposing consecutive sentences did not
render the plea defective so long as the court used a reasonable means to ascertain
defendant's understanding of his plea).
133State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004) (citing United States v. Gonzalez,
202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000)).
134See id.
135Id.
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Immigration judges have adopted a categorical approach in evaluating a
non-citizen's criminal conviction for the purpose of deportability.13 6 Under
this approach, the immigration judge is limited to the wording of the statute
under which the defendant was convicted and must determine whether the
defendant is removable based only on the length of the sentence given to
the defendant. 137 There are two exceptions to the application of this
approach: (1) if the language of the particular subsection of the statute at
issue defining the term aggravated felony invites inquiry into the
'
underlying facts of the case, or (2) if the statute is "divisible."138
A statute
is said to be divisible when the statutory language contains some offenses
that would qualify as aggravated felonies and others that would not. 3 9 If
the provisions of the statute are divisible or vague, then the immigration
judge applies a modified categorical approach.1 40 The modified categorical
approach allows the court to determine if the record unequivocally
establishes that the defendant was convicted of the generically defined
crime, even if the statute defining the crime is overly inclusive.' 4' In this
instance the immigration judge must look to the record of conviction,
including the indictment, the plea, the verdict, and the sentence, to
determine the offense for which the alien was convicted. 142 The subjective
nature of this evaluative approach leads to starkly contrasting
determinations reached by immigration judges even within the same
jurisdiction.
Even a single judge's evaluation of the record of conviction for
different defendants can lead to different results depending on the wording
of the documents in the record of conviction. 143 The sentencing judge will
consider the defendant's conduct as it is described in his or her indictment;
depending on the wording and level of detail in particular indictment, the
judge may choose a more severe or more lenient sentence. Another
136 Joseph, supra note 118, at 56; Michael Vastine, Being Careful What You Wish For:
Divisible Statutes-Identifying a Non-Deportable Solution to a Non-Citizen's Criminal
Problem, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 203, 208 (2007) (discussing the complications in evaluating
whether convictions under divisible statutes result in immigration consequences).

137Id.

138See, e.g., Joseph v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 465 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2006).
139Obasohan v. U.S. Att'y. Gen., 479 F.3d 785, 788 (11th Cir. 2007).
140 See, e.g., Martinez-Perez v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2005).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See generally Vastine, supra note 136, at 225 (explaining that where a record
of
conviction is consistent, determining the offense for which the alien was convicted is
straightforward, but that in many instances the record of conviction contains different
terminology in the indictment, plea, and judgment, so defense counsel must argue all of the
possible interpretations of the record to shield an alien from removal).
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complication arises in situations where a single record of conviction
contains inconsistencies. In cases where the record of conviction does not
terminology may be
track and restate the criminal statute, different
144
employed in the indictment, plea, and judgment.
Furthermore, different judges place different weight on the collateral
consequences of the offender's immigration status. First, offenders are not
required to disclose their immigration status in state criminal proceedings,
and indeed they are not generally asked about their legal status. 1 45 Second,
judges have reacted differently upon discovering the offender's immigration
status, from disregarding it during sentencing and ignoring the collateral
the sentence
immigration consequences of the sentence imposed to reducing
146
imposed to avoid immigration consequences on the offender.
Consider Mary's case, discussed in the introduction of this
Comment. 147 Mary faced removal as the result of a simple assault
conviction arising from a dispute over a man more than ten years before
removal proceedings were initiated against her. 148 Contrast Mary's case
with the brutal assault and stabbing of twenty-three year old Micah Painter
49
by a group of non-citizens, motivated by Micah's sexual orientation.1
Three men brutally stabbed Micah with broken bottles while yelling
abusive comments such as, "You're going to die faggot!"' 150 After they
were found guilty, the judge, who was apprised of the potential immigration
consequences to the three perpetrators, reduced the one-year sentence he
had initially given the men by a single day so that they would avoid the
collateral immigration consequences.1 5 1 A sentence of at least one year for
the crime of violence they had committed would have rendered the
perpetrators aggravated felons for immigration purposes, subjecting them to
144An example of this is the case of a non-citizen who was granted permanent legal
residence in the United States in 1971. Id. at 225. Mr. R- and several others were charged in
2004 for conspiring to embezzle Section 8 housing-designated federal funds. Id. Mr. R- was
charged on four separate counts of a federal indictment. As a result of a plea agreement, Mr.
R- admitted one count of the indictment, "Conspiracy to Steal Government Funds." Id.
However the indictment described in detail conduct "possibly including embezzlement, theft,
and fraud." Id. As a result, after Mr. R- was sentenced to three years' probation, the
custody for immigration. Id.
Department of Homeland Security took him ~ito
145 Joseph, supra note 118, at 56.
146 See generally David S. Keenan, The Difference a Day Makes: How Courts

Circumvent FederalImmigration Law at Sentencing, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 139, 163 (2007)
(arguing that judges unconstitutionally sentence non-citizen criminal defendants with the
goal of preventing criminal consequences).
147 See supra Part I.
148 Lewis, supra note 1.
149 Keenan, supra note 146, at 139-41.
0 Id. at 140.
"' Id. at 141.
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Because this judge chose to consider the offenders'
removal.1 52
153
immigration status when he sentenced them, they were not removed.
This inconsistency not only reflects the injustice that may result from
judicial differences, but also underscores the ineffectiveness of the
legislation in reducing criminality in the United States.
5. IncreasedInconsistency and UnpredictabilityCreatesIncentivesfor
Illegality and Criminalityin Immigration
The 1996 Acts were introduced to reduce the presence of
undocumented immigrants already in the country and to deter new illegal
immigration. However, the laws have failed to achieve these goals.
Although they eliminate older immigration law loopholes that seemed to
reward immigrants for remaining in the country illegally, the 1996 Acts do
not offer any incentive for aliens to leave the country. 154 Since the passage
of IIRIRA, there has been a dramatic growth in the number of
undocumented individuals.1 55 Undocumented aliens have an incentive to
remain here covertly for as long as possible rather than try to legalize their
status; if they are discovered as having illegal status in the process of trying
to legalize it, they will be removed, with a bar to reentry of up to ten
years.156
The increasing number of immigration prosecutions is taking federal
resources away from addressing dangerous criminal offenders. Between the
years 2000 and 2004, federal prosecutions of persons for violating
immigration laws have increased by 125%, making immigration violations
the single largest category of federal crimes-surpassing even drug
prosecutions.1 57 In 2004, prosecutions for illegal entry after removal made
up 59% of the immigration prosecutions in federal district courts, and in
2006, these prosecutions continued to be the largest category of
immigration prosecutions. 58 The Immigration and Customs Enforcement
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Hardin,

supra note 65, at 320 (critiquing the Court's reasoning in Fernandez-Vargas

and anticipating the effects the decision would have on future deportation proceedings in the
United States).
155 Bemstein-Baker, supra note 16, at 374 (arguing that although naturalization is a
powerful form of integration into society, the recent laws have made citizenship more
difficult to obtain).
156 Hardin, supra note 65, at 320.
157 TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, TRAC REPORT: TIMELY NEW
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DATA S14OW PROSECUTIONS CLIMB DURING BUSH YEARS (2005),

http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/136.
158 TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, CRIMINAL IMMIGRATION
PROSECUTIONS FOR MAY 2006 (2006), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/.
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(ICE) agency claims that it is successfully targeting criminal aliens, but it
does not provide any data on the nature of the crimes committed by the
fugitives it targets. '5 9
The expansion of the aggravated felony definition, its retroactive
application, and the lengthy or permanent bars to reentry undermine any
deterrent effect the measures were intended to have. Those who already
face removal without the availability of discretionary relief and who may
also face permanent or long-term bars to reentry have no additional
incentive to refrain from engaging in further criminal activity. 16 Moreover,
if the criminal alien faces a permanent bar to reentry into the United States,
there is an incentive for that alien to continue to enter the country
illegally-often to visit family members who remain here legally-since
there is no legal means by which the alien could enter the United States,
and
6
the worst he or she faces is another removal with a permanent ban.' '
Furthermore, the current immigration laws have left non-citizens with
a deep mistrust of the government and a motivation to perpetuate
criminality. Non-citizens are often afraid to report crime because of fear of
being placed in removal procedures.162 The fear of removal extends to both
undocumented immigrants without a criminal conviction and to legal
permanent residents who have been convicted of crimes. This was
observed in places like Palm Beach, Florida, where non-citizens from
several Latin American and Caribbean countries are targeted by criminals
because they are less likely to report crime. 163 Removals have also torn
families apart, often taking away a family's sole breadwinner and leaving
other members of the family in a precarious position, sometimes unable to
support themselves. 164 Cases like this create prime situations for the

monthlymay06; TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, TRAC INS REPORT:
NEW FINDINGS (2005), http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/131/.
159 Chac6n, supra note 85, at 1847.
160 Id. at 1885 (noting that when § 212(c) discretionary relief was available, immigration
judges routinely warned aliens who were given relief that relief in the future would be
unlikely if they were involved in criminal activity again).
161 A study funded by the Pew Hispanic Foundation demonstrated that after the
enactment of the 1996 laws and the alarming number of removals that followed, "the number
of immigrants coming into the United States actually soared, with the number of
undocumented migrants growing faster than other segments of the immigrant population."
Id. at 1889 (noting that the policy failed both as national security or crime control, and also
as immigration control).
162 Chac6n, supra note 85, at 1886.
163 Id.
164 One woman left behind to raise her son alone, after her husband was deported as a
result of the aggravated felony measures of the 1996 Acts, described the experience this
way:
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impoverished and emotionally battered families of deported immigrants to
resort to crime to make ends meet and 165to feel alienated from the
government and from the population at large.
In the 2008 presidential campaigns, issues related to illegality and noncitizens were debated in the context of providing driver's licenses to
undocumented immigrants. 166 The argument against providing driver's
licenses to undocumented residents suggests that doing so would enable
their illegal presence by allowing them to blend into society. 67 Proponents
of this view often tie the availability of driver's licenses for undocumented
aliens with terrorism, arguing that the driver's license is used for many
purposes other than driving, including boarding airplanes.1 68 The other side
of the debate recognizes that providing undocumented aliens the option to
drive legally will promote public safety by enabling undocumented aliens to
obtain automobile insurance, which is not possible without a valid
license. 169
Many undocumented aliens drive unlicensed and thus
uninsured. 170
Maintaining the status quo and denying licenses to
undocumented individuals will incentivize them to drive covertly and shun
responsibility in the case of accidents for fear of their own removal.
Furthermore, drivers without licenses are more prone to accidents because
they may not be familiar with the rules of the road.' 71

[M]y husband (father of our 2 kids) was deported in 2003. My son was 11 at the time and he
was in the immigration courtroom at the time the judge told Martin he was to be deported and
not allowed to come back for at least ten years. I had not seen my son cry too often but I saw his
heart break that day .... Martin was deported for a crime that was a misdemeanor he committed
6 years prior and spent 30 days in jail for. Martin is a great father and husband he is not a
criminal, so when we went to court I thought everything would be ok but our lives have changed
forever. Martin was the sole supporter of our family .... I lost our apt. in Feb. and since I have
no family that would help us I took my kids to Mexico and we stayed there with Martin and his
family. My kids have missed school and lived in poverty that most people could never
comprehend.

Kanstroom, supra note 105, at 215-16 (responding to Professor Chac6n's discussion of
immigration reform).
165 See Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The War on Terrorism as a War on
Immigrant Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 574 (2004).
166Adam Nagourney, A Day Later, Clinton Embraces Spitzer's License Effort, THE
CAUCUS, Oct. 31, 2007, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/a-day-later-clintonembraces-spitzers-license-effort/.
167 Domenico Maceri, Driver's Licenses for Illegal Immigrants, NEW AMERICA MEDIA,
Oct. 28, 2007, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view-article.html?articleid=40a7e6
9186a 1d789a3ae 10786841 a6bd&from=rss.
168 Id.
169

Id.

170

id.

171

Id.
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Immigration attorneys have few options to offer at-risk, non-citizen
clients who wish to challenge the application of the aggravated felony status
to their convictions, often for non-violent misdemeanors. Non-citizens
convicted of even a minor crime that falls within the expansive aggravated
felony definition face nearly certain removal, which in many cases means
separation from U.S.-citizen family members. Therefore, non-citizens
convicted of an aggravated felony have no incentive to adjust their status to
legal permanent resident if they are currently undocumented or to seek
naturalization if they are already legal permanent residents. Instead, the
best strategy for these individuals for avoiding removal is to refrain from
drawing any attention to their status in the hope of escaping the reach of the
1996 Acts. The harsh penalties imposed by the 1996 Acts, and the
inconsistent application of their provisions, have increased the illegality that
the 1996 Acts were in fact trying to prevent.
V. RE-ESTABLISHING A Focus ON REHABILITATION IN IMMIGRATION LAW
WILL DETER CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, REDUCE THE BURDEN ON THE COURTS,
AND ACCURATELY PREDICT THE DESIRABILITY OF PROSPECTIVE U.S.
CITIZENS

A. FOCUSING ON REHABILITATION IN IMMIGRATION LAW WILL
DETER CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND REDUCE LITIGATION IN THE
IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
Focusing on the rehabilitation of the criminal offender in immigration
law would better deter further criminal activity than the current regime,
which sanctions immigrants years after they served their sentences and even
after they have proved to be responsible members of society. The previous
availability of § 212(c)'s discretionary waiver of deportation focused on
rehabilitation. Immigration judges were charged with evaluating various
factors such as the rehabilitation efforts of the immigrant since his or her
conviction, his or her family ties, and the potential family impact of
deportation.172 Giving the criminal alien a second chance provides an
73
incentive to refrain from further negative contact with the government.
There are also economic and societal benefits because first-generation
immigrants are better members 74
of society, statistically committing fewer
citizens.1
native-born
crimes than
172 Bill Ong Hing, Response, Providinga Second Chance, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1893, 190305 (2007) (discussing the problems with deportation as crime control in the context of
international law).
173 See generally id.

174 See Chac6n, supra note 85, at 1879-81.
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Non-citizens increasingly wish to challenge their predicament due to
these measures. 175 These challenges have overburdened the courts to the
extent that in the past five years, the number of Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) decisions challenged in appeals courts has more than tripled,
increasing from 7% to 25%.176 Legislative enactments since 1996 have
resulted in a sharp increase in litigation in the federal courts on immigration
matters affecting criminal aliens. Long-time residents of the United States
will continue to fight their removal from the country because of the ties
they have established in the country. They will continue to overburden the
courts with litigation over the application of the 1996 Acts, particularly in
cases where they face deportation as a result of a relatively minor criminal
conviction. The combination of the aggravated felony measures and the
Supreme Court's holding in St. Cyr-reinstating the possibility of § 212(c)
relief from removal to individuals with pre-1996 convictions-has resulted
in a jump in motions to reopen immigration cases affected by AEDPA177or
IIRIRA where the alien may still be eligible to apply for § 212(c) relief.
After the passage of AEDPA and IRIRA, the government adopted a
policy of moving to dismiss petitions to review in federal courts of appeals,
which led to increased habeas litigation over deportation orders 1 78 The
government realized this and reversed its policy, attempting to preserve
jurisdiction in the courts of appeals, but by then it was too late; there was
already an established practice for habeas litigation.1 79 The jurisdictionstripping measures of the 1996 Acts caused more cases to be litigated in
both the courts of appeals (petitions for judicial review of administrative
orders) and in the district courts (habeas petitions challenging removal
orders). 180 Furthermore, courts of appeals are now also reviewing the
habeas decisions rendered in the district courts, resulting in an overall

175

See John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in Federal

Courts ofAppeals: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 13, 14 (2006).
176 Id. at 20.
171 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44 (2008) (explaining that prior to St. Cyr these immigrants
could not take advantage of the more lenient § 212(c) relief from removal, but after St. Cyr
those immigrants with convictions prior to 1996, which was the enactment date of IRIRA,
can now re-open their case to take advantage of § 212(c) relief, which looks to the hardship
posed by removal to both the immigrant and his family).
178 Nancy Morawetz, Back to Back to the Future? Lessons Learnedfrom Litigation over
the 1996 Restrictionson JudicialReview, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 113, 116 (2007) (exploring
judicial review in the context of litigation over the 1996 immigration laws).
' Id. at 42-43.
180 Lenni B. Benson, Making PaperDolls: How Restrictions on JudicialReview and the
Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. Sot.
L. REv. 37, 42 (2007) (discussing the impact of the judicial review restrictions of the
immigration laws on the administrative process).

2009]

RETHINKING THE INCREASED FOCUS

increase at all levels of judicial review.1 8 1 The measures aimed at
itself and
streamlining the process led to litigation over the process 82
litigation over the accuracy of the decisions rendered by the BIA.1
The courts are also burdened by aliens who pled guilty to criminal
convictions and are now facing deportation. These aliens have fought their
removal either by trying to withdraw their guilty pleas on grounds that the
trial court did not inform them about the immigration consequences of the
plea, or by claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in violation83 of the
Sixth Amendment; both arguments have been largely unsuccessful.1
If Congress provides reasonable means of relief from removal for noncitizens who have committed minor offenses, especially when these
offenses were committed many years before the removal proceeding, it will
reduce the incentive for non-citizens to fight the measures through the
judicial system. Although a limited waiver of deportation at the discretion
of the Attorney General is available in some circumstances, the alien
generally has to wait outside the United States for the Attorney General's
determination. 184 Therefore the alien has to weigh the risk of never being
able to return to the United States against the risk of remaining in the
country illegally for as long as possible. The availability of "reasonable and
realistic opportunities" for a non-citizen who is facing deportation to legally
immigrate in the future creates incentives to comply with administrative
decisions and stop litigating about the boundaries, including federal court
review of orders of removal and federal habeas petitions. 85
B. COURTS SHOULD ASSESS THE IMMIGRANT'S ABILITY TO REFORM
AS A PRODUCTIVE AND MORAL U.S. CITIZEN RATHER THAN
FOCUS ON PUNISHMENT
Many of the non-citizens affected by the expanded definition of
aggravated felony and its drastic repercussions are persons who have
committed minor offenses in the past and have since lived exemplary lives.
The federal sentencing guidelines allow for a reduction in the sentence of an
offender based on evidence of rehabilitation, among other factors, and

Id.
Id. at 46.
183 Sarah Keefe Molina, Comment, Rejecting the Collateral Consequences Doctrine:
181

182

Silence About DeportationMay or May Not Violate Strickland's PerformanceProng, 51 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 267, 268 (2006) (discussing how aliens who pled guilty to criminal offenses
have challenged the validity of their pleas in light of the collateral immigration
consequences).
184 Benson, supra note 180, at 66.
185 Id. at 68.
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186
judges frequently apply this factor in determining a particular sentence.
Furthermore, evidence of continued perpetration of criminal activity allows
187
a judge to enhance the sentence recommended for a particular offense.
This illustrates a legislative and judicial perception that the rehabilitation
efforts made by the offender are suggestive of the defendant's future
conduct and ability to integrate into society.
Americans have long aspired to achieve the "American dream." The
American dream's depiction of people from humble backgrounds being
able to achieve great things has become a key American ideal. 188 Many of
the non-citizens affected by the 1996 Acts have achieved their own version
of the American dream since their commission of a crime and now face the
very real possibility of having their
dream shattered without regard to their
189
current contributions to society.
This situation is not only inconsistent with social perspectives
ingrained in American culture, but it is also counterproductive from an
economic perspective. The laws attempt to eliminate from this country
non-citizens who are now productive workers and would generate revenue
income and provide employment opportunities for others.

VI. CONCLUSION
The expansion of the aggravated felony concept through recent
immigration legislation was aimed at reducing the presence of criminal
aliens and deterring criminal conduct in the immigration context. The
public discourse surrounding the passage of these laws reflected the general
misunderstanding regarding the impact of non-citizens on the increasing
crime and incarceration rates in the United States. The aggravated felony
restrictions expanded the scope of the convictions covered to include

See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128.S. Ct. 586, 600-01 (2007).
Id.
188 See generally JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS, THE EPIC OF AMERICA (Little, Brown & Co.
1941) (using the term "American dream" to refer to equality of opportunity based on
personal ability rather than social status).
189 One of many examples is the case of Humberto Fenandez-Vargas, who was deported
in the 1970s after being in the country illegally. Hardin, supra note 65, at 291, 299-301.
Femandez-Vargas reentered the United States and lived here covertly until 2001, when his
original thirty-year-old deportation was reinstated pursuant to IIRIRA. Id. In the thirty
years that he lived in the United States, Fernandez-Vargas had a son who is a United States
citizen, married, and established a successful trucking business. Id. Fernandez-Vargas was
discovered by authorities when he attempted to legalize his status through his wife, who was
a legal permanent resident. Id. Based on the new laws, Fenandez-Vargas, who was now a
responsible and productive member of this country, was removed from his home, family, and
business. Id.
186

187
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criminal conduct that is neither aggravated nor a felony by federal criminal
law standards.
The implementation of the laws, particularly with regard to the
aggravated felony classification and mandated removal, has resulted in an
inconsistent and unpredictable application. The main areas of inconsistency
involve the subjective evaluation of a non-citizen's record of conviction,
which is often itself inconsistent among its different components, differing
statutory definition for crimes in different jurisdictions, and the different
sentences applied for the same conviction within a single jurisdiction.
The unpredictability and inconsistency inherent in the implementation
of AEDPA and IIRIRA and the restriction of the waivers of removals, even
with respect to long-time, legal permanent residents, have provided
incentives for illegality in the immigration context and have promoted
criminality in immigrant communities. The laws have resulted in the
unintended consequence of encouraging illegal immigrants in the United
States to continue to live in the country covertly for fear of removal and
barred reentry for extended periods of time.
The expansion of the aggravated felony concept has also led to
increased litigation and the overburdening of federal courts at all levels.
Long-time residents are challenging both procedural and substantive
aspects of the laws in record numbers because the costs of adhering to
administrative determinations are too high, often involving the loss of one's
family, home, and employment. The laws have forced long-time residents
to challenge these laws at all levels in order to attempt to escape or delay
the drastic consequences.
Finally, the shift away from rehabilitation to punishment has not
resulted in a better evaluation of who would be desirable citizens for the
country. Long-time residents who have committed a criminal offense in the
past but have since demonstrated that they have been rehabilitated by
refraining from criminal activity, maintaining regular employment, and
becoming integrated into American society, should be allowed to pursue
legalization of their status and naturalization. These immigrants have the
potential to become productive citizens and to make significant
contributions to society.
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